of course not
The Wirecard network processed payments from customers to merchant accounts and collected a fee for in theory providing a better, faster, cheaper service. What could go wrong? There was demand, supply, a better mousetrap, German banking regulators, big money, and brand name auditors to swear to the 22% operating margins.
Then the intrepid investigative journalists at the Financial Times reported that the money was not there. Well, actually, that 2 billion euros of the 10 billion euros that the auditors swore were there in Asian accounts was not. The German regulator took umbrage, not to the claim of the missing money but the claimant and sought to file suit against the journalists for defamation which left the lender Deutsche Bank just enough time to foist the Wirecard loans on unsuspecting shepherds of other people's money.
The Arabs were the last buyer in through Softbank and bathed in a $1.6 billion Euro convertible bond that could be turned into Wirecard shares. Despite the elevated financial alchemy the investment remained a $1.6 billion Euro claim somewhere in the capital structure of Wirecard presuming the Arabs had not sold their positions to, say, the German Landesbank because, clearly, Landesbanks are in the trade of underwriting digital assets.
By the time the auditors who swore that the $2 billion was in the accounts said it wasn't the Wirecard Chief Operating Officer had decamped for the Philippines or maybe he had not because two Filipino Immigration officers have been reassigned for their claim that he had arrived despite the airport cameras' inability to confirm their imaginations.
Singapore suggested that Wirecard maintain its customer monies in accounts at local banks and that could only be a suggestion because Wirecard has not received its regulatory approval to operate in Singapore but was allowed to while the application was pending.
The Germans arrested the CEO.
Deutsche Bank is a zero bid for that part of the business that does have a 22% margin but that would only be known by the partner of the audit firm that was hired by Wirecard to run the books.
Not sure where he is.
The Wirecard network processed payments from customers to merchant accounts and collected a fee for in theory providing a better, faster, cheaper service. What could go wrong? There was demand, supply, a better mousetrap, German banking regulators, big money, and brand name auditors to swear to the 22% operating margins.
Then the intrepid investigative journalists at the Financial Times reported that the money was not there. Well, actually, that 2 billion euros of the 10 billion euros that the auditors swore were there in Asian accounts was not. The German regulator took umbrage, not to the claim of the missing money but the claimant and sought to file suit against the journalists for defamation which left the lender Deutsche Bank just enough time to foist the Wirecard loans on unsuspecting shepherds of other people's money.
The Arabs were the last buyer in through Softbank and bathed in a $1.6 billion Euro convertible bond that could be turned into Wirecard shares. Despite the elevated financial alchemy the investment remained a $1.6 billion Euro claim somewhere in the capital structure of Wirecard presuming the Arabs had not sold their positions to, say, the German Landesbank because, clearly, Landesbanks are in the trade of underwriting digital assets.
By the time the auditors who swore that the $2 billion was in the accounts said it wasn't the Wirecard Chief Operating Officer had decamped for the Philippines or maybe he had not because two Filipino Immigration officers have been reassigned for their claim that he had arrived despite the airport cameras' inability to confirm their imaginations.
Singapore suggested that Wirecard maintain its customer monies in accounts at local banks and that could only be a suggestion because Wirecard has not received its regulatory approval to operate in Singapore but was allowed to while the application was pending.
The Germans arrested the CEO.
Deutsche Bank is a zero bid for that part of the business that does have a 22% margin but that would only be known by the partner of the audit firm that was hired by Wirecard to run the books.
Not sure where he is.
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